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PARTIES 
1. Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") was at all times relevant a corporation with 
its principal place of business located in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Fox was 
licensed in the State of Utah as a general contractor with its primary business as a general 
contractor for commercial buildings. 
2. Gary Porter Construction d/b/a Porter & Sons ("Porter") was at all 
times relevant a sole proprietorship, owned by Gary A. Porter ("Mr. G.A. Porter"), with 
its principal place of business located in Magna, Salt Lake County, Utah, and was a 
licensed subcontractor. 
3. National Surety Corporation ("National") was at all times relevant an 
Illinois corporation, and was authorized and licensed to conduct business within the State 
of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended) this civil appeal is 
within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court and was transferred to the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953, as amended) on or about 
February 26, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in determining that Fox's Memorandum in 
Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment fails to comply with Rule 4-
501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Preserved for appeal in the Record at 
pages 563 - 605, 1103 -1160, 1262 pages 32 -49 and 1263 pages 19-25. 
Standard of Review: This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court 
for correctness when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial 
court's decision no deference. Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-188 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the Utah Appellate 
Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
2. Whether the district court erred in determining that Fox's Memorandum in 
Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment fails to properly identify and 
set forth disputed issues of material facts. Preserved for appeal in the Record at pages 563 -
605, 1103 -1160, 1262 pages 32 -49 and 1263 pages 19-25. 
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Standard of Review: This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court 
for correctness when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial 
court's decision no deference. Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-188 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the Utah Appellate 
Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
3. Whether the district court erred in evaluating the information and failed to 
give Fox every reasonable inference that could be drawn from the material facts presented to the 
district court. Preserved for appeal in the Record at pages 563 - 605, 1103-1160, 1262 pages 
32 -49 and 1263 pages 19-25. 
Standard of Review: This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court 
for correctness when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial 
court's decision no deference. Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-188 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the Utah Appellate 
Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
4. Whether the district court erred by signing the June 2002 Order granting 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment after a hearing on the motion. Preserved for appeal in 
the Record at pages 563 - 605, 1103 -1160, 1262 pages 32 -49 and 1263 pages 19-25. 
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Standard of Review: This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court 
for correctness when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial 
court's decision no deference. Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-188 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the Utah Appellate 
Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
5. Whether the district court erred in determining that the Plaintiff was 
entitled to attorney fees. Preserved for appeal in the Record at pages 563 - 605, 1103-1160, 
1262 pages 32 -49 and 1263 pages 19-25. 
Standard of Review: This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court 
for correctness when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial 
court's decision no deference. Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-188 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the Utah Appellate 
Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
6. Whether the district court erred by signing the December 2002 Order 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees after a hearing on the motion. Preserved for 
appeal in the Record at pages 563 - 605, 1103 -1160, 1262 pages 32 -49 and 1263 pages 19-
25. 
3 
Standard of Review: This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court 
for correctness when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial 
court's decision no deference. Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-188 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the Utah Appellate 
Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES 
Determinative Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38, See Addendum 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-39, See Addendum 
Determinative Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15, See Addendum 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56, See Addendum 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-501, See Addendum 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Fox entered into a general contract ("Contract") with the University of Utah 
("University") for the construction of a new Women's Gymnastics Training Facility on 
the University's campus in Salt Lake City, Utah ("Project"). Record at pages 667 - 668 
at paragraphs 1-2, pages 397 - 398 at paragraph 1, and pages 418 - 421. In 
connection with the Project, Fox, as principal, and National, as surety, issued a payment 
bond ("Payment Bond") for the benefit of persons supplying labor and material in 
connection with the Project, as required under the terms of the Fox / University Contract. 
Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2 , page 398 at paragraph 2, and page 
422. 
Fox entered into a written subcontract with Porter ("Subcontract"), under which 
Porter was to provide certain work related to the excavation and placement of soil 
materials in connection with the Project. Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1 -
2, page 398 at paragraph 3, and pages 423 - 430. The Project was completed and the 
parties attempted to reach an agreement as to the final payment to Porter. Fox claimed 
that Porter had been paid the full amount under the Subcontract, plus all additional work 
required by change orders, except for approximately $24,000.00. Record at page 592, 
In. 5 through page 593 In. 12. This amount was tendered to Porter by Fox, but the 
payment was rejected by Porter. Id. 
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Porter filed its complaint with the Third Judicial District Court on March 16, 2000 
("Complaint"). Record at pages 1-8. Porter then filed a Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Complaint on or about January 12, 2001. Record at pages 32-33. The Court 
granted Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to file an Amended Complaint on or about February 
28,2001. Record at pages 46-47. On or about March 14, 2001, Porter filed its 
Amended Complaint, which included an action against National, as the surety, upon the 
Payment Bond. Record at pages 53-59. On or about April 29, 2002, the district court 
held a hearing on National's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and Fox's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion. Record at page 663. 
The proposed Order was filed with the district court and Fox timely objected to the 
proposed Order. Record at pages 664-666. The Court signed Porter's proposed Order 
on June 6, 2002, ("June Order") awarding damages to Porter in the amount of 
$161,346.70. Record at pages 667-669. 
National and Porter could not agree on a proposed order granting National's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the district court wrote and issued its own 
Memorandum Decision and Order on July 18, 2002, ("July Order") which granted 
National's Motion for Summary Judgment against Porter. Record at pages 791-798. 
As a result of its successful defense of the Payment Bond claim made by Porter, on 
July 31, 2002, National filed its Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees, along with a 
supporting Memorandum and an Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees. Record at pages 839-892. 
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Porter filed its Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Against Fox, Inc., its supporting 
Memorandum, and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs on October 17, 2002. Record 
at pages 1171-1194. 
The Court heard several of the pending motions on October 22, 2002. Record at 
page 1224. Judge Bohling filed the Order awarding Porter $41,775.66 in attorneys' fees 
on December 4, 2002. Fox filed its Notice of Appeal with the Third District Court on 
January 3, 2003. Record at pages 1232-1239. 
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals under case number 20030071-CA. 
Porter filed its own appeal from the district court case which was assigned a case number 
of 20030272-SC. The two cases were consolidated, using case number 20030071-CA, on 
or about July 10, 2003. After an attempt to mediate this case, it is now ripe to move 
forward with the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts taken from the district court's record are pertinent to the issues 
raised in the parties appeal: 
NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION'S FACTS 
1. Fox entered into a general contract with the University for the construction 
of a new Women's Gymnastics Training Facility on the University's Project. Record at 
pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2, pages 397 - 398 at paragraph 1, and pages 418 -
421. 
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2. In connection with the Project, Fox, as principal, and National, as surety, 
issued a Payment Bond for the benefit of persons supplying labor and material in 
connection with the Project, as required under the terms of the Fox/University contract. 
Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2, page 398 at paragraph 2, and page 
422. 
3. Fox entered into the written Subcontract with Porter, under which Porter 
was to provide certain work related to the excavation and placement of soil materials in 
connection with the Project. Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2, page 398 
at paragraph 2, and page 422. 
4. The last date of work on which Porter provided labor or materials in 
connection with the Project, as determined by the district court, occurred on or before 
May 16, 1999. Record at pages 321 - 322 at paragraph 3 and pages 324 - 325 at 
paragraph 3. Porter's last invoice to Fox on the Project is dated January 25, 1999. 
Record at pages 137 and 552. 
5. On or about April 23, 1999, Mr. G. A. Porter prepared and faxed a letter to 
Mr. Tom Christiansen ("Mr. Christiansen") of Campus Construction and Design at the 
University requesting the bond information on the Project. Record at pages 39 and 41, 
page 139 In. 19 through page 140 In. 16, page 131 In. 13 through page 143 In. 17, 
page 144, pages 322 - 323 at paragraph 8, page 328, and page 592 In. 2 through page 
593 In. 22. 
8 
6. In that letter, Mr. G.A. Porter requested Mr. Christiansen to provide the 
"bonding information as soon as possible as we are filing suit immediately." Record at 
pages 39, 41,144, and 328. 
7. Mr. G.A. Porter also sent a copy of the fax letter to Fox and to Porter's 
counsel, Brian Steffensen ("Mr. Steffensen"). Record at pages 39, 41,144, and 328. 
8. Mr. G. A. Porter did not go to the University personally to ask for a copy of 
the Payment Bond. Record at page 593 In. 23 through In. 25. 
9. In approximately May 1999, Mr. Mark A. Porter ("Mr. M.A. Porter"), Mr. 
G.A. Porter's son, discussed the need to get the Payment Bond information from either 
Fox or the University in order to make a claim against the Payment Bond with his father. 
Record at pages 325 - 326 at paragraphs 7 -9 . 
10. In or about June 1999, counsel for Porter, Mr. Steffensen, tried to contact 
Mr. Christiansen concerning the Payment Bond on the Project. Record at pages 606 -
607 at paragraphs 2 -4 . 
11. No further attempts were made to secure a copy of the Payment Bond prior 
to Porter filing its original Complaint. Record at pages 606 - 607 at paragraphs 2 - 4 . 
12. Porter filed its original Complaint against only Fox on or about March 16, 
2000. National was not named, there were no doe sureties named, nor was there a 
payment bond cause of action against Fox included. Further, there was no mention of any 
Payment Bond claim against any person or entity, including Fox. In the original 
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Complaint Porter asserted a claim against Fox for breach of contract for an amount in 
excess of $80,000.00. Record at pages 1 - 8. 
13. Fox filed its answer on or about April 14, 2000, ("Answer"). Record at 
pages 12 -17. 
14. Between June 1999 and June 2000, neither Mr. G.A. Porter, Porter, nor its 
counsel made any other attempts to secure a copy of the Payment Bond. Record at pages 
606 - 607 at paragraphs 2 - 4 . 
15. On or about June 29, 2000, Fox's counsel provided a copy of the Payment 
Bond to Mr. Steffensen, counsel for Porter. Record at page 335. 
16. After receiving the Payment Bond information from Fox in June 2000, 
Porter failed to take any action on that information until on or about January 12, 2001, 
when Porter filed its Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint to add National and a bond 
claim to the case. Record at pages 32-41. 
17. On or about February 28, 2001, the district court granted Porter's Motion 
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Record at pages 46 - 47. 
18. On or about March 14, 2001, Porter filed its Amended Complaint, which 
was the first time Porter had made a payment bond claim against National, the bond 
principal (Fox), or the Payment Bond. Record at pages 53 - 59. 
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19. The Amended Complaint became operative on March 14, 2001, almost 22 
full months after Porter's claimed last day of work on the Project, May 16, 1999. Record 
at pages 53 - 59. 
20. After service, National answered Porter's Amended Complaint on or about 
July 10, 2001. Record at pages 96 - 104. 
21. National filed its Motion for Summary Judgment ("National's Motion) on 
or about December 4, 2001. Record at pages 114 - 162. 
22. After full briefing and oral argument, the District court issued and signed its 
Memorandum Decision and Order granting the National's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on or about July 18, 2002. Record at pages 791 - 798. 
FOX CONSTRUCTION, INC.'S FACTS 
23. Fox entered into a Subcontract with Porter, under which Porter was to 
provide certain work related to the excavation and placement of soil materials in 
connection with the Project. Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2 , page 398 
at paragraph 3, and pages 423 - 430. 
24. Both Fox and Porter agree that the Subcontract contained at least one error. 
Section 02680 was included in the Subcontract when it was outside the scope of Porter's 
work. Record at pages 435, In. 18 through page 436, In. 14. 
25. In his deposition, Floyd Cox ("Mr. Cox") explained that Mr. G.A. Porter 
and the estimator for Fox, Jeff Wood ("Mr. Wood") had several conversations about the 
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Subcontract regarding two issues; first, that there was a specification section left out of 
the Subcontract (Section 02300); and two, that a specification was included in the 
Subcontract that should not have been (Section 02680). Record at page 576, In. 2 
through page 578 In. 22. 
26. Mr. Wood explained that Porter gave Fox a bid for all the civil work on the 
Project. Record at page 595, In. 25 through page 597 In. 24. 
27. Mr. Wood testified that there was a section of the specifications that was 
left out of the Subcontract by mistake. Record at page 598, In. 1 through In. 20. 
28. Mr. Cox went on to testify that Section 2300 had been unintentionally left 
out of the Subcontract. Id. 
29. Mr. Cox believed that Porter's bid included Section 2300 and Mr. Cox did 
not see an exclusion of Section 2300 in Porter's bid. Id. 
30. Porter claimed to have performed "additional" work and sought 
"additional" compensation under Section 2300 (earthwork), 02665 (waterlines, valves, 
and appurtenances), and 02711 (foundation drainage systems). Record at pages 526 -
532, paragraphs 13 - 35. 
31. Mr. Cox explained that Porter was asking for additional money for work 
and what Fox's position was concerning Porter's request. Once again, Mr. Cox explained 
that Section 2300 was included in the Subcontract. Record at page 579, In. 12 through 
page 584 In. 14. 
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32. There were ongoing discussions between Porter and Fox about the 
Subcontract and Section 2300. Id. 
33. The University took the position that Porter was responsible for Section 
2300. Id. 
34. Addendum 4 was included in the Subcontract. That Addendum relates to 
Section 2300. Record at page 585, In. 1 through page 586 In. 8. 
35. Mr. Cox was not aware of any requests by Fox for Porter to do work outside 
of the scope of work under the Subcontract. Record at page 587, In. 7 through In. 23. 
36. Porter failed to follow the proper procedure for requesting any change 
orders. Id. 
37. Fox issued and delivered a check to Porter in the amount of approximately 
$24,000.00 as a complete and final payment for the work on the Subcontract in April 
1999. Mr. G.A. Porter rejected that check because he believed that the correct amount 
was between $34,000.00 to $37,000.00 in April 1999. Record at page 592, In. 5 
through page 593 In. 12. 
38. On or about April 23, 1999, Mr. G.A. Porter prepared and faxed a letter to 
Mr. Tom Christiansen ("Mr. Christiansen") of Campus Construction and Design at the 
University requesting the bond information on the Project. Record at page 139 In. 19 
through page 140 In. 16, page 131 In. 13 through page 143 In. 17, pages 322 - 323 at 
paragraph 8, and page 592 In. 2 through page 593 In. 22. 
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39. In Porter's fax letter to Mr. Christiansen, located at page 144 in the Record, 
Mr. G.A. Porter identifies the amount of money Porter was claiming was still owed as 
being approximately $40,000.00 on or about April 23, 1999. Record at page 144. 
40. Porter filed its Complaint against Fox only, National was not named, there 
was no doe surety named, nor was there any mention of a payment bond claim against any 
person or entity in the Complaint. The Complaint included a claimed amount of in excess 
of $80,000.00. Record at pages 1 - 8. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Summary judgment should be granted when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law while viewing all facts in 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. The Appellate Court reviews district court 
decisions on summary judgment for correctness giving no deference to the district court's 
decisions. National received an award of summary judgment at the district court level 
and this Court can only review that decision for correctness, giving no deference to the 
lower court's decision. 
In this case, the underlying project was a public building, and therefore, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-1 et seq., the general contractor was required to provide a 
payment bond. For any party to make a claim against the Payment Bond, suit must be 
filed within one year from the last date of work provided or services rendered upon the 
project by the claimant. In this case, Porter's last date of work was found by the district 
court to be on May 16, 1999. Porter filed its Amended Complaint alleging a cause of 
action under the Payment Bond on March 14, 2001, nearly twenty-two (22) months after 
its last date of work. Porter failed to file its action against the Payment Bond within the 
time allowed by Utah law. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend its pleading, 
causing the amended pleading to relate back to the original pleading, under certain 
circumstances. In this case, however, the relation back doctrine does not apply. Porter 
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cannot be allowed to circumvent the statute of limitations by using the relation back 
doctrine. Furthermore, National and Fox have a relationship which is contractual only, 
which is not sufficient to show an identity of interest sufficient to allow relation back to 
the time of the original Complaint by Porter. 
In addition, equitable tolling is not applicable in this case. Porter knew about this 
dispute in as early as February 1999, yet failed to make any claim on a payment bond 
until March 2001. The discovery rule does not apply in this case to toll the statute of 
limitations for Porter because there is no statute mandating it, there was no concealment 
or misleading conduct on National's part, and this situation does not fit under the 
exceptional circumstances exception. For these reasons, Porter's appeal should be 
dismissed. 
The district court failed to apply the proper standard to determine Porter's 
Summary Judgment Motion. Fox supported its objection to Porter's Motion for Summary 
Judgment by admitting and denying Porter's specific paragraphs set forth in its 
Memorandum. Fox also provided specific citations to the record, which included 
affidavits and deposition testimony, for material issues of fact. There are disputes over 
what portion of the specifications for the Project were included or excluded from Porter's 
Subcontract. There are disputed facts concerning the amount of money Fox owes Porter 
for its work within the scope of the Subcontract and amount owed, if anything, for any 
additional work performed by Porter. Fox's Memorandum substantially complied with 
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Rule 4-501. Fox's citations to the record were adequate for the district court to deny 
Porter's Motion for Summary Judgment. A trial should be held on the issues the scope of 
the work required under the Subcontract, any additional work performed by Porter, and 
the amount of money Porter is owed under each of those issues. 
Porter was awarded attorneys' fees based on the grant of summary judgment. 
Porter was not entitled to summary judgment on the record before the district court. 
Based on Porter not being entitled to summary judgment, attorneys' fees should not have 
been granted and should be denied pending a trial on the merits of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
A. NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION'S ISSUES 
1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i. Standard of Review 
Before granting summary judgment, a court must find, after viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, that no disputed issues of material fact 
exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Norman v. Anchor Development, 73 P.3d 357 (Utah 2003). All reasonable 
inferences must be drawn from the facts and taken in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 63 P.3d 705 (Utah 2002) (citing Pigs 
Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002)). 
17 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 
438 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, summary judgment is appropriate in at least two 
circumstances: first, if there could be no reasonable difference of opinion on a 
determination of the facts 'in the usual sense' or on an evaluative application of the legal 
standard to the facts; and second, when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently 
established that determining causation becomes 'completely speculative.' Id. at 438. 
This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court for correctness 
when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial court's 
decision no deference. Utah case law states that: 
Summary judgment is granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment is a 
question of law which we review for correctness, according no deference to 
the trial court's decision. 
Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-88 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 
945 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the 
Utah Appellate Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
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In National's Motion, Porter was the non-moving party and was entitled to every 
reasonable inference from all facts asserted by either party in their respective pleadings. 
The district court viewed all asserted facts in a light most favorable to Porter when it 
considered the National's Motion. The Court gave Porter every reasonable inference and 
viewed the facts in Porter's favor for purposes of the Natinal's Motion. 
ii. Utah Code Title 63 Chapter 56 
The Project is a "public building of the state or a political subdivision of the state" 
to which Title 63, Chapter 56 of the Utah Code Annotated applies, requiring the general 
contractor to provide a payment bond. See also Utah Code Ann. § 14-1-18(2). In 
compliance with the statute and with Fox's contract requirement with the University, Fox 
as principal, and National, as the surety, issued an appropriate payment bond in 
connection with the Project. Fox and National complied with all legal requirements set 
forth in Fox's contract with the University by issuing a payment bond on the Project. 
Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Code governs claims for payment under such payment 
bonds by those providing labor, equipment or materials to the Project. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(5) states in its entirety that: 
An action upon a payment bond shall be brought in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in any county where the construction contract was to be performed and 
not elsewhere. The action is barred if not commenced within one year after 
the last day on which the claimant performed the labor or service or supplied 
the equipment or material on which the claim is based. The obligee named in 
the bond need not be joined as a party to the action. 
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(Emphasis added). Fox was required to provide a payment bond pursuant to its contract 
with the University. It fulfilled its obligation under the contract by purchasing a payment 
bond from National for the Project. The bond met all of the requirements of the contract 
and the Utah statutes for a state government project. The University is subject to the Utah 
Code and is required to follow the Utah Procurement Code when it procures construction 
of any building on its campus. The Utah Procurement Code provides a procedure for any 
person to receive a copy of any bond issued on any Utah state project. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-56-39. Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-39 provides: 
Any person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond upon 
payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and postage, if any. A 
certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, 
execution, and delivery of the original. 
Despite Porter's efforts to obtain a copy of the Payment Bond on the Project, both 
Porter and its counsel failed and/or refused to follow the statutory requirements to either 
go to the University or mail a request to the University for a copy of the Payment Bond. 
By either going to the University and paying for a certified copy of the Payment Bond or 
sending a request to the University by mail with the appropriate postage and cost of the 
certified copying costs, Porter could have received a copy of the Payment Bond at any 
time during the year following its last date of work. 
Although disputed, the district court determined that the last day Porter provided 
labor, equipment or material to the Project was on or before May 16, 1999. Under the 
Utah Procurement Code, Porter's claim upon the Project's Payment Bond was required to 
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be filed, if at all, no later than May 16, 2000. Porter was fully aware of the existence of 
its Payment Bond claim as early as February 1999, after its January 1999 invoice was not 
paid by Fox. As of April 23, 1999, Mr. G.A. Porter knew that Porter was planning to 
make a Payment Bond claim, based on the letter that he sent to the University. Porter was 
communicating with its attorneys regarding the bond issue at the time. Nevertheless, 
Porter failed to make a Payment Bond claim against anyone or any entity within the 
statutory time frame, to its detriment. 
Porter failed to commence any action against National or upon the Payment Bond 
until March 14, 2001, more than twenty-two (22) months after its last day of work, May 
16, 1999. Porter failed to comply with the statute of limitations set forth in the Utah 
Procurement Code by failing to commence its action against the Project's Payment Bond 
within one (1) year of last performing work on the Project for which the Payment Bond 
was issued. 
Porter filed its initial Complaint in this case on March 16, 2000. The original 
Complaint does not contain any claim upon the Project's Payment Bond, or against the 
bond surety, or against the bond principal under the Payment Bond. Each of the three 
causes of action asserted in the original Complaint is alleged against Fox under theories 
unrelated to the Payment Bond or National. 
Porter was provided with a copy of the Project's Payment Bond on or about June 
29, 2000 by Fox's counsel. At the time the bond was transmitted, Defendant's counsel 
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notified Plaintiffs attorneys of the statute of limitations defense. Porter took no action on 
its Payment Bond until January 2001. On or about January 12, 2001, six and one-half 
(61/2) months later, Porter filed its Motion to Amend the Complaint, wherein it sought 
leave of the Court to amend the Complaint to add a cause of action against Natinal upon 
the Payment Bond. Porter's Motion was filed almost 19 months after Porter's last date of 
work on the Project, May 16, 1999. 
iii. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15 
Porter's Motion to Amend its Complaint was based on Rule 15 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Porter argues that Rule 15 allows its Amended Complaint to relate 
back to the date of filing its original Complaint, thereby claiming that its Payment Bond 
claim is timely. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the relation of 
amendments back to pleadings has no application in the present case. Porter's reliance on 
that rule to avoid the statute of limitations is misplaced. Subdivision (c) of Rule 15 does 
not apply to amendments that substitute or add new parties to those brought before the 
Court by the original pleadings because such amendments amount to assertion of a new 
cause of action and defeat the purposes of statutes of limitations. Wilcox v. Geneva Rock 
Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); 
Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984); Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 
902 (Utah 1976). 
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There is an exception to this rule only where both new and old parties have an 
identity of interest so that it can be assumed or proved that relation back is not prejudicial. 
Privity of contract is not sufficient to show identity of interest for the exception to apply. 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). The relationship between Fox and National is one of 
contract and nothing more. Porter asserts and claims Fox and National have an identity of 
interest in order for the exception to apply under Rule 15(c). Porter claims that because 
Fox had to report its financial condition to National, that act amounts to "economic carnal 
knowledge" of each other and "that [National] 'knew' Fox in the Biblical sense." 
Whatever these phrases mean, Porter uses them to create the appearance of a unity of 
interest that triggers the exception in Rule 15(c). These strange phrases were use by 
Porter's counsel and do not change the reality of the contractual relationship between Fox 
and National. The simple truth is that Porter did not bring a payment bond claim during 
the one-year time frame set forth in the statute. Therefore, without the exception in Rule 
15(c), Porter is unable to make a claim against National and Porter is forever barred from 
bringing a payment bond claim against National on the Project. 
It is undisputed that Utah is a notice pleading state. All Porter was required to do 
was to simply plead a cause of action for an award based on the Project's Payment Bond. 
This claim could have been made against Fox as a principal and the Payment Bond. A 
claim could have been made against a Doe Surety and Porter could have amended its 
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Complaint to add the correct name of the surety once it was discovered. Porter could 
have named the University for failing to require Fox to purchase a payment bond on the 
Project. Porter did none of these things. In fact, Porter's original Complaint did not even 
mention or use the word "bond" or "payment bond" in any context. The original 
Complaint was made only against Fox and only under contractual theories. Porter took 
no thought to make a payment bond claim until January 12, 2001, despite its knowledge 
that it could make such a claim. 
This is not the first time that Porter's counsel has failed to plead a cause of action 
regarding a bonding issue within the statutorily allowed time frame. In a previous case, 
Farnsworth v. Diller, et al, Salt Lake County case Number 980901179, a district court 
case before Judge Bohling, Porter's counsel failed to plead a cause of action for failure to 
obtain a payment bond within the statutorily allowed time. Porter's counsel attempted to 
correct their mistake by filing a Motion to Amend their Complaint to include the failure to 
obtain a payment bond claim, but received an adverse ruling in that matter when the 
district court denied the Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint to include such a cause of 
action on the grounds that the statute of limitations had already run. Record at pages 186 
at paragraph 6 and 204 paragraph 4. 
In the present case, Porter was allowed to amend its Complaint for the purpose of 
joining National as a new party, and for including a new cause of action against National 
to collect under the Project's Payment Bond. Again, no claim was made against Fox on 
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the Payment Bond in the original Complaint. Under these circumstances, the amendment 
cannot be said to relate back to the filing of the original Complaint. To so hold would 
patently frustrate the purpose of the statute of limitations and would fly in the face of the 
well-established law applying Rule 15(c). Porter's argument under Rule 15(c) fails and 
National was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the applicable statute of 
limitations as prayed for in National's Motion. 
The district court granted Porter leave to amend its Complaint, without opposition, 
and the Amended Complaint was filed thereafter on or about March 14, 2001. Thus, 
Porter's claim upon the Payment Bond was not filed until more than twenty-two (22) 
months after Plaintiffs last day of work on the Project. 
Application of a statute of limitations is a question of law. Estes v. Tibbs, 979 
P.2d 823, 824 (Utah 1999). The statute is clear that an "action is barred if not 
commenced within one year after the last day on which the claimant performed the labor 
or service or supplied the equipment or material on which the claim is based." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-56-38 (4). In this case, the Amended Complaint was not filed within one year 
after the last day on which work was done or equipment or material was supplied. 
Because Porter failed to commence its action against National or under the Project's 
Payment Bond within one year of it last performing work on the Project, its claim is time 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For these reasons, National was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
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There was no intent or attempt by Porter or its counsel to state a claim upon the 
Project's Payment Bond or against National or any surety in the original Complaint. It is 
undisputed in this case that Porter was aware of its Payment Bond right and simply failed 
or decided not to commence an action to assert the right within the applicable limitations 
period. Under these circumstances, Porter's right was lost under the statute and National 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
iv. The statue of limitations was not tolled by any legal or equitable 
doctrine as asserted by Porter 
Porter's reliance on the doctrine of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is 
likewise misplaced. Porter knew that it had a payment dispute with Fox before February 
1999. On April 23, 1999, Mr. G.A. Porter wrote a letter to the University advising the 
University of the dispute and requesting information concerning the Payment Bond. A 
copy of that letter was sent to Porter's attorneys. Without any explanation, Porter then 
waited eleven (11) months, until March 16, 2000, to file its original Complaint by and 
through the same attorneys which had been contacted in April 1999. As of March 16, 
2000, Porter and its attorneys could have, but did not, include a payment bond claim in 
the original Complaint by naming Fox as the principal of the Payment Bond, and/or by 
naming Fox's Surety generically, either as "the surety" or as a John Doe Defendant, 
pending discovery of the pertinent information. Further, Porter could have named the 
University for failing to require Fox to have a payment bond on the Project. Porter and its 
counsel chose to not do so. In the original Complaint, Porter and its counsel did not 
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include any cause of action under the Project's Payment Bond or make a bond claim 
against any person or entity. There is no mention of a bond or a surety in the original 
Complaint. The Complaint named only Fox as a defendant and asserted only contract 
claims. 
Beginning March 16, 2000, Porter and its counsel had available to them the 
subpoena power and authority of the district court to compel the University and/or Fox to 
provide a copy of the Project's Payment Bond. Had they not waited nearly a year (from 
May 19, 1999 through March 16, 2000) to file Porter's action, they could have had the 
subpoena power for that much longer. Porter and its counsel took no action to subpoena 
the information until after the statute of limitations ran on May 16, 2000. Porter then 
subpoenaed the records of the University and received a box full of documents, including 
the bond documents, in response to that subpoena. Porter also failed to exercise its rights 
during the statute of limitation's one-year time frame pursuant to the Utah Code Ann § 
63-56-39 to ask for a certified copy of the bond. 
Likewise, Porter and its counsel made no formal discovery requests to Fox for the 
Payment Bond information. The Payment Bond was not at issue under the original 
Complaint. Fox had no duty to voluntarily provide the Payment Bond to Porter. 
Nonetheless, on June 29, 2000, defense counsel informally provided the bond to the 
Plaintiff, noting that at that time Plaintiff was already past the statute of limitations for 
filing an action against National. Notwithstanding that notice and after waiting an 
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additional eight and a half (8!^) months, Porter filed its claim against National under the 
Payment Bond on March 14, 2001, after it was granted leave to amend the Complaint. 
Those facts are not subject to dispute in this case. Porter's recitation of the law could not 
be more compelling as to why the statute of limitations is not tolled in the present case. 
In Utah, under certain circumstance, there may be an exception to the running of 
statutes of limitation. This exception tolls the statute of limitation until the incident is 
discovered. This exception is known as the discovery rule. "'[T]he discovery rule tolls 
the limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action are 
discovered.'" Russell/Packard Development v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616, 620 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003) (quoting Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah 2002)). According to Utah 
courts, the discovery rule applies in the following situations: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action 
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in 
situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of 
any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of 
action. 
Id. 
There are only three situations identified by the Utah courts when the so-called 
"discovery rule" will apply to toll a statute of limitations. The first situation does not 
apply because there is no statute which mandates its application to claims arising from a 
payment bond on a public works construction project. Thus Porter is left with 
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concealment or special circumstances as potential reasons to apply the discovery rule. 
However, as noted by Porter, the threshold question regarding the discovery rule is 
whether Porter "learns of or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action." See Williams v. Howard, 970 
P.2d 1282 (Utah 1998); Klinger v. Rightly, 889 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The 
facts giving rise to the cause of action both against Fox and National were that Fox had 
not paid Porter as Porter had demanded for work on the Project. It is undisputed that 
Porter knew that it had a payment dispute with Fox on and before February 1999. Porter 
knew and had reason to know that there was a payment bond for the benefit of Fox's 
unpaid subcontractors when it wrote to the University on April 23, 1999. It was not a pre-
requisite for Porter to obtain a copy of the Payment Bond in order to include a claim in its 
original Complaint. Mr. G.A. Porter's suggestion that Porter could not proceed without a 
copy of the Payment Bond in his attorneys' hands prior to filing the Complaint has no 
basis in fact or law. Even if it were necessary, Porter wholly failed to act with reasonable 
diligence when it waited for almost ten (10) months before filing the contract action 
against Fox only. Thereafter, Porter never did take action to obtain the Payment Bond 
through formal discovery methods. It cannot be overemphasized that there is no mention 
of a bond, a surety, or National in the original Complaint. Porter and its attorneys 
intentionally omitted a claim on the Payment Bond and did not pursue such claim until 
well after the statute of limitations had run. Porter both knew and had reason to know of 
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the facts giving rise to its cause of action against National from as early as February 1999. 
Porter simply took no action on the claim until it was too late. 
The discovery rule has no application under the undisputed facts of this case. 
There is no equitable or other tolling doctrine which operates to avoid the impact of the 
statute of limitations found at Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(4). National was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under that statute. 
Porter's argument concerning concealment by Fox likewise fails under the present 
circumstances. As indicated above, Porter has neither alleged nor provided any 
information to demonstrate that Fox and National had an identity of interest sufficient to 
hold National liable for anything Fox did or failed to do on its own account. From the 
undisputed facts of this case it cannot be said that Fox improperly concealed information 
relating to the cause of action from Porter which impeded its discovery or a cause of 
action against National. But even assuming arguendo that Fox had engaged in some 
nefarious effort to conceal the existence of a claim on the Payment Bond, National cannot 
be held accountable for Fox's actions. Porter has failed to allege or to offer any 
information that Fox was the agent of National for any purpose relating to the present 
case. Thus, the legal authorities purporting to hold a principal liable for the concealment 
by its agent can have no application in the present case. There is no allegation that Porter 
ever made any inquiry or request from National for the bonding information or that 
National had any reason to know that a claim or a potential claim was outstanding against 
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it or the Payment Bond. There is no basis in law or fact to apply the discovery rule to the 
detriment of National in this case, particularly where Porter knew that it had a right to 
assert a bond claim and had more than ample time to avoid the statute of limitations 
altogether. Under these circumstances, the statute of limitations was not and cannot be 
tolled. National was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the applicable statute 
of limitations. 
Finally, the balancing test for whether special circumstances exist to justify 
depriving National of the benefit of the statute of limitations tips clearly against Porter 
under the circumstances of this case. The hardship imposed by the statute of limitations 
in this case is one of Porter's own making. Porter's lack of diligence in pursuing its 
remedies is what led to the waiver imposed by the statute of limitations. The forfeiture 
was not caused by Fox, National, or any other person or party. Porter cannot wait ten (10) 
months to file its original Complaint, and then, eight and a half (8V2) months after 
receiving the bond information, file a claim against National, and then be heard to 
complain that special circumstances exist to thwart the statute of limitations. The statute 
of limitations afforded to National a substantial right of repose from claims which could 
have been asserted during the limitations period in order to reasonably limit its 
contractual exposure and to compel the expeditious resolutions of claims on construction 
projects. National would be unduly prejudiced in that right in the extreme were this Court 
to toll the statute as requested by Porter. The balancing between the deprivation of the 
31 
rights of National caused by Porter's own lack of diligence weighs overwhelmingly in 
National's favor in this case. 
Moreover, in this case, Porter cannot and has not met the initial threshold showing 
that it did not know and had no reason to know of the cause of action during the 
limitations period. Such a conclusion flies in the face of the undisputed facts of this case. 
Accordingly, there is no balancing test and no other rule in law or equity which operates 
to toll the statute of limitations in the present case. National was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of the well-settled law. 
B. FOX CONSTRUCTION, INC.'S ISSUES 
1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harline, 912 P.2d at 438. All 
reasonable inferences must be drawn from the facts, pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, and taken in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Lovendahl, 63 P.3d 705 (citing Pigs Gun Club, 42 P.3d 379). 
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This Court looks at the summary judgment decision of a trial court for correctness 
when the issue of summary judgment comes to it on appeal, giving the trial court's 
decision no deference. Utah case law states that: 
Summary judgment is granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment is a 
question of law which we review for correctness, according no deference to 
the trial court's decision. 
Rosas v. Eyre, 82 P.3d 185, 187-88 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge for 
summary judgment presents only questions of law." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 
945 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Those questions of law are reviewed for correctness, with the 
Utah Appellate Court according no particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id, 
In Porter's Motion, Fox was the nonmoving party and was entitled to every 
reasonable inference from all facts asserted by either party in their respective pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. The district court should 
have viewed all asserted facts in a light most favorable to Fox when it considered Porter's 
Motion. The district court failed to give Fox every reasonable inference and view the 
facts in Fox's favor for purposes of Porter's Motion. 
ii. Utah Rules of Judicial Administrative Rule 4-501 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was amended in 
November 2001. The amendment became effective just a few weeks prior to the filing of 
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the Memorandum in Opposition to Porter5 Motion with the district court. Porter cites 
Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) for the proposition that Fox failed to 
comply with Rule 4-501. See Brief of Appellee and Cross Appellant at page 27. The 
Fennell Court states in the pertinent part: 
It is clear that Fennell failed to comply with the rule. He did not refer to 
Defendants1 statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead included only 
his own statement of undisputed facts. As a result, it was unclear what 
facts Fennell contended were disputed. 
Id. at 341 (emphasis added). In the Fennell case, Fennell only included his own statement 
of facts and did not comment on whether or not he disputed any of the facts asserted by 
Green. The circumstances in the Fennell case are distinguishable from the circumstances 
in this case concerning compliance with Rule 4-501 in that Fox disputed specific 
paragraphs in Porter's statement of facts, and presented specific facts, referenced to the 
district court record, to demonstrate specific disputed issues of fact. Fox substantially 
complied with Rule 4-501, Fennell did not. Porter goes on to cite the Lovendahl case as 
additional support for its position that Fox's Memorandum did not comply with Rule 4-
501. A review of the underlying facts in the Lovendahl case reveals that the Lovendahls 
never discussed the Jordan School District's argument based on Mr. Lovendahl's 
deposition testimony concerning the value of their property. Lovendahl, 63 P.3d at 717. 
The Lovendahl Court goes on to state: 
Indeed, none of the evidence of "damage" the Lovendahls discuss on appeal 
was ever put before the trial court at the summary judgment stage. That is, 
the Lovendahls never drew the trial court's attention to any specific record 
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evidence showing damage to their land, home, or any injuries related to the 
inverse condemnation claim. The only record evidence before the trial 
court was the Lovendahls1 admission that the value of their property had 
actually increased since the time the sewer vent pipe was installed. 
Id. The Court stated that under those circumstances the Lovendahls were not allowed to 
argue that there was a lack of evidence. Id. 
The Memorandum filed by Fox in opposition to Porter's Motion for Summary 
Judgment substantially complied with the requirement of Rule 4-501. Substantial 
compliance is a doctrine which is defined as "[compliance with the essential 
requirements, whether of a contract or of a statute." Black's Law Dictionary 1428 (6th ed. 
1990). Utah courts have held that substantial compliance with contracts or statutes will 
be held valid even if strict compliance was not followed. 
For example, Utah mechanic's lien law allows for technical inaccuracies which 
will not to invalidate liens. The Utah Supreme Court has found that technicalities in a 
mechanic's lien do not absolutely invalidate a lien. Utah courts acknowledge a 
substantial compliance exception to a strict reading and interpretation of the mechanic's 
lien statute. Utah courts have followed numerous other states and the State of Utah has 
adopted the prevailing modern trend in applying the substantial compliance exception to 
mechanic's liens. Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990). 
If the alleged failures of the mechanic's lien do not infringe on the rights of others, if the 
purpose of the mechanic's lien statute is not compromised, and if there is no prejudice 
35 
toward the opposing party, then substantial compliance allows the mechanic's lien to 
stand. Id. 
Also by way of example, the Utah Supreme Court found, in a case regarding the 
timely exercise of a party's rights of redemption to property he owned in joint tenancy 
with the opposing party, that part of Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should 
be viewed under the strict compliance doctrine and part should be viewed under the 
substantial compliance doctrine. The Court "concluded that 69(f)(3) implicates 
substantive rights, requiring strict compliance with its terms." Springer v. Springer, 853 
P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 1993). Interpreting this conclusion of the Utah Supreme Court, 
statutes dealing with substantive rights are interpreted under the strict compliance 
doctrine, whereas statutes dealing with procedural rights are interpreted under the 
substantial compliance doctrine. 
In Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the Utah Court of Appeals 
"stated that the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 'are not intended to, nor do they, 
create or modify substantive rights of litigants, nor do they decrease the inherent power of 
the court to control matters pending before it.'" Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339, 341-42 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citing Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)). 
Although Utah courts have emphasized the importance of compliance with the Rules of 
Judicial Administration, substantial compliance in this case should be allowed. 
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In this case, Fox answered and responded to Porter's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Fox disputed specific numbered paragraphs of Porter's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts, and Fox included additional Undisputed Facts. The only thing that Fox 
did not do to comply with Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration was set out 
verbatim Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts before disputing the specific facts. 
Fox's action in its brief responding to Porter's Motion for Summary Judgment 
does not infringe on the rights of Porter. It does not prejudice Porter in any way. And 
furthermore, Fox did comply with the policy reasoning behind the Rule in that Fox did 
specifically dispute some of Porter's facts, albeit without stating verbatim all of Porter's 
Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
Based upon this, substantial compliance should be used by the Court to conclude 
that Fox did substantially comply with Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration 
and that by doing so, summary judgment should have been denied at the district court 
level due to the existence of disputed issues of material fact. This is especially true since 
the rule change had only been implemented a short time before Fox's brief was filed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reviews summary judgment motions under a 
correctness standard. It was an abuse of discretion by the district court to determine that 
Porter's facts should be deemed admitted under Rule 4-501 under the circumstances of 
this case. 
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In this case, Fox either admitted or disputed each numbered factual paragraph set 
forth in Porter's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. Fox's 
Memorandum in Support of the Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Fox's Memorandum") was filed on April 8, 2002. Record at pages 563 - 603. The 
district court determined that despite Fox's Memorandum addressing each of the 
enumerated facts alleged by Porter, see Record at pages 564 - 567, then Fox set forth 
additional specific facts, see Record at pages 567 - 569, with citations to deposition 
testimony of Mr. G.A. Porter, Floyd Cox (Mr. Cox), and Jeff Wood (Mr. Wood), that the 
Memorandum failed to meet the requirements of Rule 4-501. Record at pages 574 - 603. 
However, Fox substantially complied with Rule 4-501 by specifically disputing the facts 
set forth in Porter's Memorandum and identifying specific facts that, when viewed in a 
light most favorably to Fox, clearly described disputed issues of fact to be tried by the 
trier of fact. Record at pages 564 - 603. 
The district court's decision is further undermined since the district court allowed 
oral argument concerning all of the facts asserted by Fox which created disputed material 
issues of fact about the amount Porter claimed to be owed. Record at 1262 pages 32 -49 
and 1263 pages 19-25. The district court failed to give Fox every inference from all of 
the facts in the court file, whether in the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, deposition transcripts, or heard in oral argument. 
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Clearly from the court record, the district court abused its discretion in granting 
Porter's Motion as to the amount Fox owed Porter. The evidence before the district court, 
when all inferences are drawn in Fox's favor, demonstrate that there were genuine issues 
of material fact as to the amount of money Porter was entitled to receive. Mr. G.A. Porter 
rejected a $24,000.00 check tendered by Fox to Porter because Mr. GA Porter believed 
the correct amount was between $35,000.00 and $37,000.00. Record at page 592 Ln. 9 -
page 593 Ln. 9. In its letter dated April 23, 1999, contemporaneous with the Project, 
Porter states: 
Fox Construction owes Porter and Sons Construction the sum of $40,000 
plus or minus for work performed on the Women's Gymnastic Training 
Center and is refusing to pay. They have not paid anything for the New 
addition we worked on. 
Record at pages 39, 41,144, and 328. Porter's original Complaint and its Amended 
Complaint assert a claim in excess of $80,000.00. Record at page 4. In Porter's Motion 
it claimed that it was owed $161,346.70. Record at page 416. 
As a result of the erroneous district court ruling, it was held that a mistake was 
made in the Subcontract between Fox and Porter. A section of the work that had been 
included in the Subcontract was removed from operation of the Subcontract by use of 
parol evidence. The result of the district court's ruling also keeps Section 2300 out of the 
contract when there was testimony in the record that the first section that was taken out of 
the Subcontract should have been Section 2300. Porter was an excavation contractor. 
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The work it was hired to perform was earthwork pursuant to Section 2300 of the Prime 
Contract between Fox and the University. 
Fox was the nonmoving party and is entitled to all reasonable inferences drawn 
from the facts taken in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. It can clearly be 
seen from the deposition testimony of Mr. Cox, Mr. Wood and Mr. G.A. Porter there are 
disputed issues of material fact concerning the Subcontract and the issues of the scope of 
work which was to be performed by Porter. Record at pages 574 - 603. Mr. Cox and 
Mr. Wood both testified in their depositions that Section 2300 was left out of the 
Subcontract by mistake. Record at page 575, In. 4 through page 576, In. 19 and page 
595, In. 25 through page 597, In. 19, page 598, In. 1 - 11. Despite the allegations by 
Porter, Mr. Wood in fact testified in his deposition that he had mistakenly left Section 
2300 out of the Subcontract. Record at page 598, In. 1 - 11. He went on to say that the 
amount of the Subcontract was not reduced accordingly for the reduction in work to be 
performed by Porter not having to be responsible for Section 2300 work. Id. It should 
be remembered that Porter relied on Mr. Wood's deposition testimony to establish the 
amount of damages it claimed. Porter then asserts that the testimony of Mr. Wood is 
inadequate to raise an issue of fact as to the work included in the Subcontract or the 
amount that should be paid to it as a result of the work performed on the Project. Mr. 
Wood's testimony is not only admissible, but raises disputed issues of material fact that 
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should have precluded summary judgment. Therefore, the district court abused its 
discretion in granting Porter's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Porter acknowledges that a mistake was made in the Subcontract in that the gas 
piping section was included and should not have been. Porter relies on parol evidence 
from Mr. Cox to support its position that Porter was not required to perform the 
installation of the gas piping. Therefore, Fox should have been able to assert parol 
evidence of the mistake that left Section 2300 out of the Subcontract. Any inferences that 
can be drawn must be drawn in favor Fox. Those facts would support an inference that 
Section 2300 was included in the Subcontract and therefore, there should be no additional 
charge to Fox for work within the scope of Section 2300. 
There are also questions of fact concerning Porter's approach to any claimed 
change orders. Questions of fact exist as to whether Porter did work outside of the scope 
of the Subcontract without the benefit of a change order as required by the Subcontract. 
These issues raise questions as to any amount still owing to Porter for work it actually 
completed. At a minimum, there is a question of fact concerning the inclusion of Section 
2300 being in the Subcontract. 
As for Porter's argument that it is entitled to summary judgment on its quantum 
meruit theory, there remain disputed issues of material fact, because that theory requires a 
determination of the existence of a contract for the relevant work and of the value 
conferred to the owner for the work performed. The amount of benefit conferred on the 
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University would have to be established by evidence. There is nothing in the evidence 
before the district court that demonstrated the value of the benefit Porter provided to the 
University. Porter claims that Section 2300 was not included in its base Subcontract and 
therefore, it should be compensated for its work on any item that comes within that 
section's description. However, Mr. Cox and Mr. Wood testified that Section 2300 was 
mistakenly left out of the Subcontract and was intended to be included, and was included 
in the scope of work bid by Porter. 
The testimony outlined herein makes it clear that there is a dispute as to the scope 
of work the Subcontract covers. Porter asserts parol evidence to show that there was a 
portion of the work set forth in the Subcontract that it was not required to perform. 
Nevertheless, Porter refused to acknowledge that its bid for work under the Subcontract 
included the scope of work contemplated in Section 2300. In a motion for summary 
judgment, the facts are to be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
in this case Fox. There is a dispute as to whether Fox requested any additional work from 
Porter or whether the work in question was within the scope of the Subcontract. It 
appears that Porter wants to rewrite the parties' Subcontract and then unilaterally create a 
new contract between the parties. The district court is not allowed to make a contract 
between parties better than the contract itself, which is what Porter asked the district court 
to do. The simple fact that there is a dispute as to whether the requested work, as set forth 
by Porter, was additional or within the Subcontract was enough to defeat Porter's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment and have the district court deny that Motion. Further, there is a 
clear dispute of fact as the amount, if any, to which Porter may be entitled to receive as an 
award for its work on the Project, either under the contract or for additional work 
performed. Nevertheless, the district court abused its discretion and erroneously granted 
summary judgment to Porter despite the disputed issues of material fact in the district 
court file and the argument before the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and argument set forth herein, Fox hereby requests that this 
Court issue an Order reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment and award 
of attorneys' fees to Porter and against Fox. Further, that Fox be allowed to present its 
case to the trier of fact on its merits, and for such other relief as the Court deems just and 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Pursuant to the facts presented by both parties and the arguments set forth in the 
brief, National requests that this Court issue an Order affirming the district court's grant 
of summary judgment and the award of attorneys' fees to National and against Porter. 
Further, that National be awarded its costs and attorneys' fees in defending Porter's 
appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment to National, and for such other 
relief as the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances. 
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Respectfully submitted this 0 day of April, 2004. 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES 
Determinative Statutes 
63-56-38 Bonds necessary when contract is awarded —Waiver —Action — Attorneys' 
fees. 
(1) When a construction contract is awarded under this chapter, the contractor to 
whom the contract is awarded shall deliver the following bonds or security to the state, 
which shall become binding on the parties upon the execution of the contract: 
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state that is in an amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract and is executed by a surety 
company authorized to do business in this state or any other form 
satisfactory to the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state that is in an amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract and is executed by a surety 
company authorized to do business in this state or any other form 
satisfactory to the state, which is for the protection of each person supplying 
labor, service, equipment, or material for the performance of the work 
provided for in the contract. 
(2) (a) When a construction contract is awarded under this chapter, the chief 
procurement officer or the head of the purchasing agency responsible for carrying out a 
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construction project may not require a contractor to whom a contract is awarded to obtain 
a bond of the types referred to in Subsections (l)(a) and (b) from a specific insurance or 
surety company, producer, agent, or broker. 
(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)(a) is guilty of an infraction. 
(3) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of a bid, performance, or 
payment bond for circumstances in which the state considers any or all of the bonds to be 
unnecessary to protect the state. 
(4) A person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this section for 
any unpaid amount due him if: 
(a) he has furnished labor, service, equipment, or material for the work 
provided for in the contract for which the payment bond is furnished under 
this section; and 
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days after the last date on which 
he performed the labor or service or supplied the equipment or material for 
which the claim is made. 
(5) An action upon a payment bond shall be brought in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in any county where the construction contract was to be performed and not 
elsewhere. The action is barred if not commenced within one year after the last day on 
which the claimant performed the labor or service or supplied the equipment or material 
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on which the claim is based. The obligee named in the bond need not be joined as a party 
to the action. 
6) In any suit upon a payment bond, the court shall award reasonable attorneys1 
fees to the prevailing party, which fees shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
63-56-39 Form of bonds —Effect of certified copy. 
The form of the bonds required by this part shall be established by rules and 
regulations. Any person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond upon 
payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and postage, if any. A certified copy of a 
bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, execution, and delivery of the original. 
Determinative Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
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response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original 
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading. 
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(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental 
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since 
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even 
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If 
the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it 
shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Rule 56, Summary Judgment 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary 
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with 
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be 
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rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule judgment 
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist 
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
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The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court 
at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad 
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing 
them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of 
the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorneys fees, and any offending 
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and 
documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not 
apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-
parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities 
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of 
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. 
Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length 
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to 
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file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the principal 
memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess often pages, the application shall 
include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file and 
serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails 
to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the 
motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (1)(D) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to 
file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the 
court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The Notice to Submit for Decision shall state 
the date on which the motion was served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, 
was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing 
has been requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If 
neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
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(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those 
portions of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party 
contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material facts which 
support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose 
of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by 
the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any 
claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the 
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principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written 
request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues 
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting 
party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or 
notify the requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall 
schedule the matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the 
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before 
the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the 
date and time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their 
principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the 
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of 
the court. 
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its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the 
court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where lime is ol line 
the motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
[r) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may 
direct arguments of any motioi 1 b> telephone conference w ithout com t appeal ai ic € • '"V 
requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996; November 1, 
1998; Apni . . . amended April 1 / ; v : , e:h 
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